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The proper role of courts engenders significant debate. Yet, what seems bet-
ter settled is the principle that courts are the place at which the common law is
developed. Its genesis and modifications evolve out of the juridical process and
when that process becomes encumbered or deferred to the legislature the role of
the judiciary is called into question. This essay makes the case that expressive
minimalism too often governs the common law judicial approach to biotechnol-
ogy. The cases visited in this domain test our capacity to understand whether life is
appropriately described as being beyond the definition of property, as well as the
disputed assumptions about life being commodifiable, patentable, destroyable,
and conscriptable. There are also the circumstances that demand secondary or
third party response depending on judicial expression, including what to do when
life is stolen, misappropriated or fraudulently acquired. Goodwin argues that
rather than motivating legislative action, or imbuing the bench with greater wis-
dom or information, expressive minimalism in the context of biotechnology will
likely send fuzzy signals. Fuzzy signals will not be clear messages to the legislature.
To the contrary, fuzzy signals, like those transmitted across cell phones and televi-
sions, discombobulate messages, distort pictures, and ultimately, are difficult to
read.
WHAT IS OWED PARTICIPANTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH? Julie A. Burger 55
The legal and ethical protections afforded human subjects of research afford
individuals who participate in research certain rights. Potential participants must
give voluntary and informed consent to participate, they have the right to with-
draw from research, they cannot be asked to waive certain rights, and they have
the right to choose which studies they will participate in. But researchers, institu-
tions, patient advocacy groups, and ethicists continue to debate how these rules
should be applied in the context of genetics research - projects that involve using
the individual's tissue or the individual's genetic information, such as gene se-
quences, and associated medical information. Evidence demonstrates that people
have strong feelings and preferences about how their tissue and genetic informa-
tion is used in research and who has access to it, regardless of whether their name
is associated with the sample or information. Not giving due import to individuals'
preferences could result in a loss of trust in the research enterprise, and a corre-
sponding decrease in participation in future studies.
UPSTREAM WITHOUT A PADDLE: GENE
PATENTING AND THE PROTECTION
OF THE "INFOSTRUCTURE" Seth Shulman 91
The U.S. patent system, designed to protect rights to specific, marketable gad-
gets, has increasingly over the past few decades granted patents on comparatively
abstract and amorphous ideas that stretch the system beyond recognition. Overly
broad patents, and patents too far "upstream" from the marketplace, I argue, un-
dermine the patent regime, hamper innovation, and prove exceedingly difficult to
adjudicate. Using a series of conceptual and historical analogies, I attempt to as-
sess the patenting of genes and other broad, "upstream" patents from a public
policy context, emphasizing, as many are coming to realize, that things work best
in the knowledge-based economy when what I describe as the "infostructure"-
those seminal information assets needed by all players in a given high-tech sector
to compete-are pooled and shared.
GENE PATENTS AND THE PRODUCT
OF NATURE DOCTRINE John M. Conley 109
Gene patents have proven to be enormously controversial, evoking a strong
response from many categories of skeptics. Objections have focused on the fore-
closure of research, the potential denial of healthcare, or the proper application of
the patent laws. Gene patents also tend to trigger an elemental response that lies
at the core of almost every objection: You shouldn't be able to patent a gene! This
article focuses on the latter point, restating it as a question of legal doctrine: Why
is it that the law has routinely treated genes as patentable inventions rather than
unpatentable natural phenomena? Part II reviews the basics of patent law, with
particular emphasis on patentable subject matter and the long-established product
of nature doctrine. Part III discusses the understanding of genetics that is reflected
in the patent case law, an understanding that has led the courts and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to find a material distinction be-
tween genes as usually claimed in patent applications and their naturally-occurring
counterparts. Part IV reviews several recent legal developments that, taken to-
gether, may portend some future constraints on the virtually unfettered patenta-
bility that genes have enjoyed thus far. Finally, Part V offers some concluding
thoughts on the policy implications of these developments.
HUMAN GENE PATENTS: PROOF
OF PROBLEMS? Timothy Caulfield 133
The patenting of human genes has been the focus of intense policy debate.
The concerns associated with gene patenting are diverse, ranging from dignity
based critiques to suggestions that patents will drive up the cost of health care. But
the two concerns that have generated the most policy attention are that they hurt
basic research (also known as the "anti-commons" problem) and access to useful
technologies. The goal of this short comment is to question the degree to which
existing evidence supports the speculation about these two justifications for patent
reform. While the issues associated with gene patents are complex and extend well
beyond these two specific issues, their profile within the patent policy debate justi-
fies a consideration of what the available empirical data can tell us about the legit-
imacy of the concerns. The paper concludes with a discussion of several issues
relevant to the interpretation of existing and emerging data.
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND GENE
DISPUTES Debra Harry 147
Wary from decades exploitation in the name of science, Indigenous peoples
typically approach externally-generated research with caution, and for good rea-
son. Indigenous peoples have been on the receiving end of research carried out in
insensitive, and sometimes, harmful ways. Research has historically been a top-
down, outside-in process, with Indigenous peoples serving merely as research sub-
jects, with little opportunity for meaningful participation or benefit from the out-
comes of the research. Over the past two decades, with the advent of the Human
Genome Project and other genetic research projects, there has been a correspond-
ing increase in genetic research projects that put Indigenous peoples front and
center of the research process. Geneticists' interests in Indigenous peoples' DNA
are many. Indigenous peoples' DNA is sought for medical, behavioral, anthropo-
logical, and genetic variation studies. This chapter details many of the experiences
Indigenous peoples have had with human genetic research. These stories exem-
plify the biocolonial nature of this research as it impacts Indigenous peoples.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
POLITICS OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY:
INVENTORS, CITIZENS, AND POWERS
TO SHAPE THE FUTURE Stephen Hilgartner 197
This article argues that there is a mismatch between traditional intellectual
property doctrine and the politics of intellectual property today. To examine the
nature of the mismatch, I contrast two frameworks that both appear in contempo-
rary debate about intellectual property: the traditional discourse, which focuses on
innovation policy, and a newer, less clearly codified discourse that views intellec-
tual property issues from the perspective of the politics of technology. This latter
discourse focuses on the challenge of democratic governance in a world where
emerging technologies have assumed a central role in constituting the future, rais-
ing far-reaching questions about how they should be fitted into social orders. The
innovation discourse remains dominant in policy debate, but recognizing the spe-
cific features of the politics-of-technology perspective-and presenting its distinc-
tive vision of what is at stake in intellectual property-clarifies the struggles now
in play. The politics-of-technology perspective rejects the traditional definition of
the boundaries of intellectual property policy; first, because this perspective ques-
tions the empirical validity of a bright line distinction between creating technolo-
gies and making social choices about them; second, because it sees the traditional
cartography as tending to constitute members of the public as "consumers" of
prepackaged technologies rather than "citizens" engaged in shaping them; and
third, because it has a normative commitment to enabling citizens to exercise voice
and choice about emerging technology before irreversible commitments in specific
directions are made. In contrast to traditional innovation discourse, the politics-of-
technology perspective considers patent policy from a point of view that focuses
on questions of democratic governance and political legitimacy.
STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
You DON'T OWN ME: RECOMMENDATIONS
TO PROTECT HUMAN CONTRIBUTORS OF
BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL AFTER WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY V. CATALONA Laura B. Rowe 227
As research using human biological materials has rapidly developed, so too
has the debate over the ownership of these highly valuable materials. Most re-
cently, the Eighth Circuit in Washington University v. Catalona held that research
participants do not retain any ownership interest in the biological materials they
contribute to research. This note argues that the misguided Catalona decision, in
combination with unclear, outdated, and inadequate federal research regulations,
has left human contributors of biological material largely unprotected and vulner-
able to the goals of researchers, institutions, and biotechnology firms. Accord-
ingly, this note proposes critical amendments to the federal research regulations
that will ensure the continued advancement of biomedical research by protecting
the human sources who make this research possible.
SERIES LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES:
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO MULTIPLE LLCS Sandra Mertens 271
Although series LLCs are now over eleven years old, they remain mainly
theoretical. Only seven states to date have enacted statutes authorizing series
LLCs, and the drafters of the recent Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act considered and rejected provisions creating series LLCs. Many practicing at-
torneys continue to use multiple LLCs where a series LLC may be appropriate.
This Note examines the general characteristics of series LLCs and state legislation
authorizing them, the uncertain state and unanswered questions surrounding this
new entity form, and the recent developments in case law and usage of series
LLCs. Finally, this Note recommends that state legislators enact enhanced series
legislation nation-wide to provide unity and foundation for series LLCs, which will
allow attorneys and business owners to reap the benefits of series LLCs.
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM V. JUDICIAL
ABDICATION: A PLEA FOR A RETURN
TO THE LOCHNER ERA SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS METHODOLOGY Brandon S. Swider 315
Amid the fierce battles that take place during the confirmation process of a
Supreme Court justice, surprisingly little attention is given to the fact that both
sides of the political spectrum generally agree on a matter of profound constitu-
tional importance-namely, the proper level of scrutiny courts are to exact with
respect to state and federal legislation. Presently, and for the better part of the last
70 years, the dominant attitude among judicial conservatives and liberals alike is
that courts have no authority to strictly scrutinize the overwhelming majority of
legislation enacted by state and federal legislatures.
This Comment argues that the Court's current substantive due process doc-
trine, which traditionally provided an important framework for reviewing the con-
stitutionality of state and federal legislation, not only lacks a solid constitutional
foundation but also fails to protect the most basic individual fights and liberties.
This Comment discusses the shortcomings of the substantive due process method-
ology within the context of Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, which held that termi-
nally ill individuals have no constitutional right to access innovative medicinal
treatments that have the potential to preserve and prolong their lives. This Com-
ment concludes that, although the current substantive due process doctrine is
highly flawed, the decision in Lawrence v. Texas provides a glimmer of hope that
one day the Court will reassert the judiciary's responsibility to meaningfully re-
view and scrutinize the constitutionality of state and federal legislation.
